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Courts in England and Wales have long recognised that the view from a property 
can, and often will, benefit that property.  In Aldred’s Case1, the court cited dicta of 
Wray C.J.in Bland v. Moseley2, that ‘it is a great commendation of a house that it has 
a long and large prospect’3.  The breadth of the term ‘commendation’ reflects well 
the multiple forms which the benefit of a view might take, from purely aesthetic 
considerations to related, but more commercial considerations, of increasing 
property values.  
Views depend upon the passage of light.  Reporting on rights to light4, The Law 
Commission described natural light inside buildings as ‘immensely important for 
comfortable living and working’5. Consultees observed that properties with strong 
natural light held greater appeal for buyers, and employees preferred offices with 
external windows6.  Since artificial lighting can replicate many of the properties of 
natural light, it is suggested that this human preference is not merely for natural light 
itself, but for the prospect beyond the property, which the passage of light allows to 
be seen. 
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The financial value of a view can be significant: Foster7 identifies American 
examples of a property seller on Long Island Sound who obtained an additional 
$25,000 for the view, and an apartment owner in San Francisco who successfully 
claimed $54,000 for the diminution in value arising from obstruction of a view. 
Research published by Knight Frank LLP in its ‘Waterfront Index 2015’8 indicates 
that UK properties with views of lakes, rivers, estuaries or the sea can attract 
premiums of between 33% and 91% depending on location9.  This is evidently the 
uplift available merely for the view; Where properties had private access to the 
feature, the figure rises to 118%10. 
It is perhaps therefore surprising that courts in England and Wales appear reluctant 
to protect views.  Immediately before his dicta above Wray C.J. stated that ‘for 
prospect, which is a matter only of delight and not of necessity, no action lies for 
stopping thereof’11. 
There appears to have been relatively little study in England and Wales of the legal 
protection of views.  Perhaps this is because it is widely believed that, as a general 
principle, protection is unavailable:  Faulkner states, ‘it is well understood that the 
law does not ordinarily provide a landowner with a right to a view’12. This article 
seeks to establish that, notwithstanding Wray CJ’s assertion, some legal protection 
to views is available.  It examines aspects of the protection afforded to, or withheld 
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from, views by easements, by covenants and by public law. It will be seen that both 
within and between each area, the law is neither clear nor consistent.   
Can easements of prospect exist? 
Prima facie it appears that easements of prospect cannot exist.  Gale13 states that 
‘the law does not recognise an easement of prospect’. Similarly, Sara states that ‘an 
easement cannot arise giving a right of prospect’14. 
To illustrate this restrictive position, Lord Denning in Phipps v. Pears15 [1965] 1 QB 
offered this scenario: ‘Suppose you have a fine view from your house.  You have 
enjoyed the view for many years.  It adds greatly to the value of your house.  But if 
your neighbour chooses to despoil it…you have no redress.  There is no right known 
to the law as a right to a prospect or view’16.   
The position on easements of prospect appears to be entrenched. It is also 
suggested that, even without looking further at the justifications for the rule, it 
appears counterintuitive. A householder who enjoys a view of, or over, another plot 
of land may have enforceable legal rights to walk or drive across that land, to run 
pipes beneath it, to park vehicles on it and to receive support from it, but apparently 
no enforceable right merely to enjoy the view of it or across it.  
The detailed justifications for the rule are varied. This article divides the arguments 
for precluding easements of prospect into groups, which partly overlap. 
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The ‘Uncertainty’ Arguments 
In Harris v. De Pinna17  Bowen L.J. described a right of prospect as having ‘a subject 
matter which is incapable of definition’18. The belief that, with regard to easements, 
this is an inescapable feature of a view (a belief much less evident in relation to 
covenants and public law) appears to be strong.  In Hunter v. Canary Wharf19, the 
analogy between a right to a view and a right to receive a television signal (which is, 
it is suggested, harder to define than a right to see from one point to another) was 
held to be ‘very close’20 and ‘compelling’21.   
In similar terms, Gale suggests that the justification for prohibiting easements of 
prospect may be that ‘that the subject-matter is too vague, and it would be 
inconvenient to do so’22.  Both assertions deserve attention.  A wide view across 
many miles of land may indeed be vague, but if it is, that is not because of the 
dimensions of the view in themselves, but because no attempt has been made 
precisely to define them. In principle, a right to see from one defined point to another 
without interruption is no vaguer than a right to pass and repass between those 
same two points.  Moreover, abandoning the preconception that a view deserving 
protection must necessarily be large renders the justification still less tenable.  A 
householder may greatly value the view from a window in their property to a  
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specific landscape feature, or to a definable space between landscape features, a 
few metres away. A recent Scottish example involved the installation by Virgin Media 
of broadband boxes approximately 1.5 metres high by 2 metres wide within 5 metres 
of the ground floor windows of a residential property23. There is no obvious reason 
why a view of this nature, or indeed one which differs only by being longer or wider, 
could not be precisely defined. 
The willingness of courts to accept easements which appear uncertain is not always 
consistent.  In Pwllbach Colliery v. Woodman24, Lord Sumner stated that a right to 
spread coal dust onto adjoining land could be ‘the subject not of a mere covenant to 
prevent it, but of the actual grant of the right to do it’25.  Perhaps confusingly, he 
declined to define the grant as ‘an easement properly so called’26 declaring it to be 
‘too indeterminate’27, leaving its precise nature unaddressed.  Similarly, in Lawrence 
v. Fen Tigers Ltd28, Lord Neuberger held that a right which was ‘too indeterminate to 
be an easement’ could still be ‘the subject matter of a perfectly valid grant’29 (again 
leaving unaddressed what precise form that grant would take).  He held that a right 
to emit noise could be an easement, describing it as ‘“the right to transmit sound 
waves over” the servient land’30.  It is suggested that such judicial flexibility to what 
can be the subject matter of a grant (whatever form that grant might take) might 
allow the definition of a right of prospect as ‘the right to receive a visual image’ over 
the servient land. 
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The ‘inconvenience’ argument may owe more to pragmatism than to a true reflection 
of how easements operate.  It is not argued here that protecting views in a broad 
sense is without significant difficulties; A party who enjoys a protected view can 
necessarily restrain development that blocks it, with evident inconvenience to the 
developer.  It is submitted, however, that using ‘inconvenience’ to prohibit the 
existence of rights of prospect essentially disregards the inconvenience which any 
easement can impose: The inconvenience experienced by a servient tenement 
owner, whose development is thwarted, is likely to be the same whether the 
easement preventing that development is one of access, drainage, support or 
prospect. 
 
The ‘Subjectivity’ Arguments 
Sara argues that ‘A view or prospect is essentially subjective and to provide every 
longstanding householder with such a right would constitute a very severe restraint 
on adjoining land’31.  There is perhaps a conflation of ideas here, the subjectivity 
point, and the restraint on the servient land point. In respect of the first, is a prospect, 
or the benefit which it confers, necessarily subjective? It is argued later that the 
public law approach is often that it is not. Even if it is the case that the value of a 
prospect is to some extent in the eye of the beholder, should this necessarily 
preclude the availability of judicial protection?  
The ‘restraint’ argument is similar to the ‘public policy’ arguments discussed below. 
No doubt affording every longstanding householder with such a right could severely 
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restrain development on the servient land, but it will not do so in every case. There 
might be compelling other reasons why affording a householder a right of prospect 
over a piece of land imposes no significant restraint on that land, for example if the 
land over which the view is enjoyed cannot physically support buildings or other 
structures.  There is also a conceptual difficulty in arguing that because applying a 
principle universally would create difficulties, it should not be applied at all. 
 
The ‘public policy’ arguments 
An argument presented in Bland v. Moseley and Aldred’s Case, that an action would 
not lie for stopping a view because, unlike light, a view is ‘a matter only of delight, 
and not of necessity’ was itself dismissed in Dalton v. Angus32, rightly it is suggested, 
as ‘more quaint than satisfactory’33.  The court in Dalton cited as ‘a much better 
reason’ that of Lord Hardwicke in Attorney-General v. Doughty34, that were effect 
given to easements of prospect, ‘there could be no great towns’35. It is perhaps this 
vivid justification that has led to the current restrictive position. Lord Hardwicke’s 
detailed reasoning is, however, less clear.  He stated: 
‘ I know of no general rule [emphasis added] of common law which says that building 
so as to stop another’s prospect is a nuisance; was that the case, there could be no 
great towns, and I must grant injunctions to all the new buildings in this town.  It 
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depends on a particular right, and then the party must first have an opportunity to 
answer it’36. 
This dictum deals only with the undesirability of landholders generally having 
unfettered rights to preserve views, and the consequent effects on land 
development.  This article does not contest this.  Lord Hardwicke did, however, raise 
quite clearly the possibility of individual views being protected by ‘a particular right’.  
He did not specify the nature of that right, but it is at least possible that he envisaged 
an easement.  Moreover, the premise that allowing easements of prospect would 
unduly hinder urban development is contested.  This article identifies later that public 
law can be rigorous and effective in protecting views in ‘great towns’ in England and 
Wales, and elsewhere. 
Dalton v. Angus restates in slightly different terms two of the justifications set out 
earlier: That a right of prospect would ‘impose a burthen on a very large and 
indefinite area’ 37, and that such rights would be ‘vague and undefined’38.  Both 
justifications can be challenged: A householder may attach considerable aesthetic 
and financial value to a prospect across a small well-defined area, and, as will be 
seen later, it is possible, with thought and care, to define a prospect precisely. 
Arguments based on the powerlessness of the servient owner 
Referring to Lord Denning’s example from Phipps, Sara justifies prohibiting 
prescriptive easements of prospect on the basis that ‘there would be very little that 
the adjoining owner could do to prevent such a right being acquired’39.  He asks 
                                                          
36 Dalton (n32) 824 
37 Dalton (n32) 824 
38 Dalton (n32) 824 
39 Sara (n14) 197 
rhetorically ‘When your house with the view has been there for 19 years, is he to 
erect a 30 foot screen to block your view just to demonstrate that no easement has 
been obtained’40.  This disregards the possibility that during the prescriptive period 
the landholder could expressly consent to the enjoyment of the view, thereby 
retaining control over the acquisition of the easement.  In addition, Sara himself 
acknowledges that his observation applies equally to easements of light and support 
which are often acquired by long use. 
Does equating easements of prospect with those of light or support, and thereby 
undermining the argument against the former withstand scrutiny? It is suggested that 
these types of easements can be distinguished based on the burden they impose on 
the servient land. An easement of support is likely only to apply as between adjacent 
tenements.  Similarly, the diffused nature of light is likely to mean that an action for 
interference with an easement of light will only be feasible where the interference 
happens close to the dominant land.  Conversely, a view from a house to a 
landscape feature 100 or 500 metres away may be across several potential servient 
tenements.  The further those tenements are from the potential dominant tenement, 
the less likely it is that their owners will appreciate, and guard against, the risk of an 
easement being claimed.   
Of all the justifications presented for prohibiting easements of prospect, the 
argument that the servient owner is powerless to prevent it is perhaps the most 
persuasive.  It can only, however, apply to prescriptive easements.  Perhaps what 
began as a justifiable objection to allowing prescriptive easements of prospect has 
been allowed to become an objection to all such easements, however acquired. 
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Do the courts refuse to recognise easements of prospect generally, or only 
easements of prospect claimed by long use? 
This is unclear.  Early 20th Century sources indicate that the latter approach is, or at 
least has been, the case. The 1908 edition of Gale on Easements states: 
‘Although ... by the civil law, a servitude of prospect could be acquired in the same 
manner as any other servitude, the law of England recognises no such right, except 
by express grant or covenant’41. 
The writer does not specify which civil law jurisdictions he envisaged, but the 
question arises of how, and how far, such jurisdictions accommodate easements or 
servitudes of prospect. Scots Law has characteristics of both common and civil law, 
and historically has recognised rights of prospect.  In 1833, Bell42 cited as an 
example of a negative servitude one by which the owner subject to it ‘may be 
restrained from any building which may interrupt light or prospect ‘43.  Describing how 
such rights arise, he states unambiguously, ‘Positive servitudes may be constituted 
by prescription; negative cannot’44, thereby simultaneously supporting the second 
part, but contradicting the first part, at least as far as it relates to Scots Law, of 
Gale’s assertion. 
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Notwithstanding its evident limitations, Gale’s 1908 assertion accords with 
contemporaneous dicta. In Campbell v. Mayor, Aldermen, and Councillors of the 
Metropolitan Borough of Paddington45, Avory J stated ‘I agree that the law does not 
recognise a view or prospect from a house as…an easement which can belong to 
anybody as of right (emphasis added), and that no period of enjoyment will give a 
person a right of action against another who…erects a structure or plants trees 
which obstruct the view or prospect’46. Three decades earlier in Dalton v. Angus, 
Lord Blackburn had stated that such rights should not be allowed ‘except by actual 
agreement’47. 
A century later it appears that the possibility of creating an easement of prospect 
expressly has, accidentally or by design, fallen away. In Phipps, as noted above, 
Lord Denning appeared to rule out the possibility of easements of prospect 
altogether48. Halsbury’s Laws states that ‘no easement can exist…to insist upon the 
preservation of the prospect from a property’49.  Gray & Gray set out ‘the historic 
view’ that ‘common law recognised, for instance, no such right as a prescriptive (or 
any other) (emphasis added) easement to preserve a good view over an adjacent 
landscape’50, and state explicitly that ‘…such a right may be acquired only [by] a 
restrictive covenant which precludes the owner of neighbouring land from building 
[so] as to obstruct the view which it is desired to protect’51. 
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It appears, therefore, that in England and Wales it may never have been possible to 
acquire an easement of prospect by long use, but that acquiring such an easement 
expressly (and presumably by implication) may once have been possible, but is no 




Protection of views using covenants 
While protecting views using easements appears, albeit with little apparent 
justification, to be limited and uncertain, the same cannot be said of protection using 
covenants.  In Phipps, having emphatically excluded the possibility of an easement 
of prospect, Lord Denning stated that ‘the only means in which you can keep the 
view from your house is to get your neighbour to … covenant with you that he will 
not…block your view’52. 
The judicial position here appears more accommodating. However, it is suggested 
that while covenants can confer better protection to a prospect than that available 
from easements, in practice the protection available is neither as consistent nor as 
effective as landholders might want or deserve.  
In National Trust v. Midlands Electricity Board53, the National Trust, as owners of part 
of the Malvern Hills, had the benefit of a covenant created in 1936 by the 
Ecclesiastical Commissioners, later the Church Commissioners, who were the 
second defendant.  The covenant, which was expressed to bind the covenantor’s 
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land ‘into whatsoever hands the same may come, and to benefit and protect 
Midsummer Hill [the Trust’s land]...’ stated, ‘No act or thing shall be done or placed 
or permitted to remain upon the land which shall injure prejudice affect or destroy the 
natural aspect and condition of the land...’54. 
The MEB entered the covenantor’s land to erect electricity poles in 1947.  The 
report, surprisingly, does not specify the dimensions or location of the land on which 
the work took place (other than to state it was ‘small’), or how many poles there were 
(other than there were ‘some’) but does state they were approximately 42 feet tall.  
Significantly, in the court’s view, however, all the poles were more than 1000 yards 
from the Trust’s land. 
In rejecting the Trust’s application for an injunction to restrain the work, Vaisey J held 
the covenant to be ‘void for uncertainty’55 and with evident distaste for the 1936 
drafting, described the restriction as ‘extremely inapt and ill-considered’56 remarking 
that ‘it would be difficult to find wider, vaguer and more indeterminate wording than 
those [used]’57.   
What rendered the restriction void was not, however, the nature of the wording itself, 
but ‘the omission of any criterion by which these vague and uncertain words can be 
brought under some control’58.  By implication, it appears that including such a 
criterion might have rendered the covenant effective.  It appears that in Vaisey J’s 
view, the wording of the covenant made it impossible to know what it was intended to 
achieve, and that by some leap of logic, it could not therefore have been intended to 
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prevent the work which was now envisaged.  But this reasoning disregards the 
pressing detail that the Trust had imposed the covenant in such terms (presumably 
drafted by, or at least agreed by, its solicitor), to which the defendant had agreed, 
and it was now the Trust who sought to enforce it.  The litigants were essentially the 
original covenanting parties (the Church Commissioners being the successor body to 
the Ecclesiastical Commissioners). No transfers of the benefitting and burdened land 
had occurred upon which the effect of the covenant might have been misunderstood.  
Unless between 1936 and 1947 the Trust had changed its view as to what 
constituted acceptable development, it seems logical to assume that the work carried 
out was precisely of the type which in 1936 the Trust had sought to control, and the 
defendant had accepted should be controlled. 
 
More recent cases demonstrate a more accommodating approach.  In Gilbert v. 
Spoor59  the Court of Appeal unanimously rejected an appeal from Mr Gilbert who 
wished, and had received planning permission, to build three houses in breach of a 
covenant limiting the number of houses on the land to one.  To facilitate this, he 
sought to discharge or modify the covenant under s.84 Law of Property Act 1925.  
Several neighbours objected on the basis that the new houses would obscure the 
view (described as ‘resplendent’60) over the Tyne Valley. Mr Gilbert argued that the 
covenant conferred no ‘practical benefit of substantial value or advantage’61, an 
argument with which the Court emphatically disagreed. 
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Two aspects of the decision are perhaps surprising:  Firstly, in contrast with the 
covenant in National Trust, the covenant which Mr Gilbert sought to discharge or 
modify did not refer specifically to the view; it simply required him ‘not to erect on the 
[land]...any building… other than one private dwellinghouse...’62.  It might be argued 
that the imposition of this covenant was intended primarily to control the density of 
housing and to prevent commercial use, rather than to protect the view, and to use it 
to this end was beyond its original intended purpose. Secondly, the view which the 
householders sought to protect could not in fact be enjoyed from their houses, but 
only from the road adjoining them, and from some public seats nearby. The court 
also acknowledged that there would be no interference with the view enjoyed from 
the land of the lead respondent, Mrs Spoor, which was already blocked by the house 
on Mr Gilbert’s land, built according to the covenant. 
The court seems to have attached considerable significance to the fact that the 
covenant was imposed as part of a building scheme:  Both Eveleigh and Waller LJJ 
referred to the existence of a ‘local law’63.  Eveleigh LJ noted that ‘the covenant is 
intended to preserve the amenity or standard of the neighbourhood generally’64, and 
that ‘the loss of the view just round the corner from the land may have an adverse 
effect upon the land itself’65.  Nonetheless, given the limited opportunities which the 
respondents had to enjoy the view, the decision is perhaps noteworthy for the court’s 
enthusiasm to protect it. 
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A similarly accommodating approach is evident in Davies v. Dennis66. This 
concerned a river development of 47 houses, built to give each house a river view 
through gaps between them.  Mr Davies obtained planning permission to build a 
three-storey side extension which would reduce the claimants’ river views.  His title 
(like those of his neighbours) contained a covenant requiring him ‘not to do or suffer 
to be done...anything of whatsoever nature which may be or become a nuisance or 
annoyance...’.  As in Gilbert, the covenant did not refer expressly to the river views. 
The High Court (with which the Court of Appeal agreed) held that Mr Davies’ 
proposal would breach the covenant.  It referred to Tod-Heatley v. Benham67, in 
which Cotton, Lindley and Bowen LJJ respectively defined ‘annoyance’ as ‘… an 
interference with the pleasurable enjoyment of a house’68, ‘anything which raises an 
objection in the minds of reasonable men...’69 and ‘a thing which reasonably troubles 
the mind and pleasure, not of a fanciful person or of a skilled person, but of the 
ordinary sensible...inhabitants of a house’70. These definitions had previously 
influenced the finding of Romer J. in Wood v. Cooper 71 that a trellis on top of a wall, 
which blocked both light to the plaintiff’s garden, and the view from his house, 
breached a leasehold covenant against nuisance.  
A connection may be drawn here with Sara’s reference to ‘subjectivity’ as an 
objection to permitting easements of prospect.  What constitutes ‘annoyance’ is 
perhaps no less subjective than what constitutes ‘a good view’, or the obstruction 
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thereof, but the courts appear to have had little difficulty applying an objective 
standard to the former, but not to the latter. 
 
Is it problematic if views can be protected by covenants, but not by 
easements? 
It is suggested that it is.  The apparent willingness of the courts in Gilbert and Davies 
to allow covenants to operate to prevent or restrict development which interferes with 
a view needs to be balanced with the inherent limitations of covenants.  In both 
cases, the parties who risked losing their view succeeded because they could show 
that the party proposing to block it was burdened by an appropriate covenant, of 
which they, by reference to reasonably recent building schemes (1954 in Gilbert, and 
the mid 1980’s in Davies) had the benefit.  Had the covenants not been imposed, the 
party proposing to block the view not been subject to the burden, and there been no 
effective mechanism for making the benefit run to each claimant (the building 
schemes), the actions would have failed. 
Further limitations on the effectiveness of covenants in protecting views arise from 
the requirements that the burden of a freehold covenant can only run in Equity72, that 
a covenant requiring steps to be taken to preserve a view, if construed as positive, 
will not run at all73, and the burden will only run if it would not be inequitable to 
enforce the covenant against the covenantor’s successors in title74.  Unlike 
easements, covenants in England and Wales are not legal interests in land under the 
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Law of Property Act 1925, or interests which override under the Land Registration 
Act 200275. 
  
Protection of Views by Public Law 
In both Gilbert and Davies the work which would entail impeding the views enjoyed 
had received planning permission. Not all development which might obstruct a view 
requires such permission.  It might reasonably be argued, therefore, that the 
protection afforded by planning law will be inferior to the protection, itself inadequate, 
available from covenants. 
But there is evidence of a more protective approach towards views, at least in some 
localities. Since 1938, The City of London Corporation has used the ‘St Paul’s 
Heights’ to protect views of St Paul’s Cathedral from the South Bank and the 
Thames Bridges76.  Although originally applied voluntarily between the Corporation 
and developers, the arrangement was given policy status in the 1980s, and 
significantly extended. The London View Management Framework 2012 (‘the LVMF’) 
sets out 27 ‘Designated Views’77 comprising ‘London Panoramas’, ‘Linear Views’, 
‘River Prospects’ and ‘Townscape Views’78.  It states clearly that ‘Planning 
applications for a proposal that could affect a Designated View should be  
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accompanied by an analysis ‘that explains, evaluates and justifies any (emphasis 
added) visual impact on the view’79, and that ‘A proposal that is not consistent with 
… the principles and guidance set out in [the LVMF] should be refused’80.  Each 
Designated View has one or more ‘Assessment Points’ (Designated View 18, the 
River Prospect from Westminster Bridge, has five), defined precisely by reference to 
grid references81 and is assessed from a precise height above the ground (1.6 
metres in most cases). Similar protection exists elsewhere, notably in Edinburgh, 
where more than a hundred ‘key views’ defined by reference to ‘view cones’ and ‘sky 
space’ exist across the city82, and in San Francisco and Vancouver.  
It is not argued here that Planning policies of this nature address fully the protection 
of views.  They are location specific, and unlike real property rights, can be changed 
unilaterally83. Nor do such policies compensate a party whose view is obstructed. 
What they provide is, it is suggested, significantly better – A recognition that views 
have importance and value, an objective means of defining them, and perhaps a 
means of preventing obstruction occurring without resorting to the expense and 
uncertainty of proceedings. 
The considerable detail of the LVMF and its equivalents elsewhere is beyond the 
scope of this discussion, but it is perhaps remarkable not just for its precision and 
technicality, but also for its evident certainty of purpose, which distinguishes it so 
conspicuously from the judicial indifference to the protection of views evident in the  
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easement cases.  Merely deciding the Designated Views and Assessment Points 
must have been no small task.  That a commitment to preserving views and the 
constant development of London appear to have co-existed for almost 80 years says 
much about the importance which can be attached to the former, if there is a will to 
do so, without simultaneously disregarding the latter.  Perhaps the precise technical 
detail evident here is that which Vaisey J was seeking when he ruled against the 
National Trust in 1952, and perhaps the St Paul’s Heights policy might have proved 
a suitable template for the Trust had it existed in 1936. 
One might reasonably argue that if a view can be defined precisely using principles 
of surveying and geometry, and if the development of cities can be achieved while 
still affording protection to views, much of the argument for refusing to allow 
easements of prospect falls away. Although his type of protection is locality specific, 
the means by which views are identified, assessed and protected could be applied 
anywhere, and not necessarily only by public law.  If a prospect can be defined 
precisely in Planning Guidance, it can be defined equally precisely in either a 
covenant or in the grant of an easement.   
If, as is argued here, there is no reason in principle why an easement of prospect 
could not be granted expressly, can it also be argued that such an easement should 
be capable of prescriptive acquisition? The technical difficulties of defining a view, a 
right to which has been acquired by long use, are undeniably significant, but not, it is 
suggested, insurmountable.  Perhaps as a starting point, no easement of prospect 
could arise for a view exceeding a particular distance, calculated by reference to the 
size, nature and locality of the dominant property. An alternative is statutory 
restrictions on building above a certain height within a certain distance of another’s 
land, defined by geometric principles, just as the Party Wall etc. Act 1996 defines 
works on or close to boundaries.  Rights capable of prescriptive acquisition might be 
restricted to those which (to borrow wording from section 84 (1A)(a) Law of Property 
Act 1925) confer ‘practical benefits of substantial value or advantage’, or which 
increases significantly (for example more than x%) the value of the property. The 
Law Commission identified the difficulty of calculating the amenity value of light84 and 
in particular the absence of a ‘one size fits all’ approach. The difficulties in calculating 
the amenity value of a view are likewise considerable, but the Knight Frank research 
referred to earlier indicates that such calculations are possible. It might also be that, 
as was recommended with reference to rights to light85, different tests would need to 




This article does not advocate the universal protection of views, nor does it seek to 
elevate the importance of views above that of other competing demands upon land.  
It argues that views should have something approaching parity with existing property 
rights. Currently in England and Wales, whether a view is protected is determined 
not by its nature or the value, monetary or otherwise, to the party claiming it, or 
indeed by the burden which protecting the view would impose on the land over which 
it is enjoyed, but by whether a covenant, or a planning restriction exists.  Whether it 
does exist depends more on good fortune than of a careful and consistent approach 
to recognising and protecting the benefit which views can confer. 
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How might that parity between the right to enjoy a view and existing property rights 
arise?  Practitioners and courts might together facilitate this.  Practitioners could draft 
easements of prospect in transfers of part.  If drafting easements of doubtful efficacy 
is unattractive, practitioners might draw comfort from drafting easements to park 
vehicles, which remain difficult to draft and advise upon, but which can be effective 
when drafted carefully, and operate in other common law jurisdictions. Practitioners 
might strengthen their position by supporting express easements of prospect with 
covenants.   
If, for their part, courts more readily accepted that the justifications for refusing to 
recognise easements of prospect are not wholly convincing, and that the co-
existence of historically prohibitive approach towards easements protecting views, 
with a permissive approach towards covenants protecting views creates 
inconsistency and unpredictability, the future for easements of prospect may be 
more favourable. 
 
 
 
